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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the debt crisis erupted in 1982, many debtor countries
and Western commercial banks have been engaged in protracted
rescheduling negotiations. The potential impact of these
negotiations on the economic development and political stability
of the debtor countries and on world financial and trade stability
has drawn the attention not only of the primary parties involved,
debtor countries and commercial banks, but also of international
financial institutions and creditor country governments.  In this
work, the negotiations are analyzed in order to identify the
determinants of commercial bank deot service, credit ceilings and
debt market discounts. Closed-form expressions amenable to
I empirical testing are found . They are  functions of the world
interest rate, the debtor country government rate of time
fLbLUf  tS1W¢,  iilU  tuiue utidertying  characteristics ot tne economy
(degree of openness, productive capital efficiency,  investment and
depreciation rates, severity of foreign exchange and fiscal
constraints, international trade vulnerability to sanctions, and
2 investment sensitivity to sanctions)
1Empirical work is not reported in this piece.
2In a companion paper,  "IFIs Financial Support and Commercial  Debt
Service: a Bargaining Approach," the role of international
financial institutions as interested third parties is analyzed.
1While there is a fairly large literature about international
debt, the negotiation process itself has usually been assumed
3 away  Some exceptions are Sachs  [1983], Krugman [1985], Bulow
and Rogoff  [1988b,1989b], Fernandez and Glazer  [1988] and
4 Fernandez-Arias  [1989]
Some of these papers neglect many relevant aspects of actual
negotiations in order to focus on how the parties have organized,
providing an economic analysis of why debtor countries bargain
independently while banks have been able to cooperate and form a
consortium. Sachs and Krugman focus on the importance of the
banks' collusion in preventing a default crisis triggered by each
bank's free-rider attempt. Fernandez and Glazer, and
Fernandez-Arias  analyze the failure of the debtor countries'
5 cartel
The rest of the papers employ richer bargaining models,
taking as given that banks are able to collude and debtor
3Examples  are  Eaton,  Gersovitz  and  Stiglitz  [1986]  and
references contained therein.
4Fernandez  and  Rosenthal  [1988,1989] present  a  series  of models
wheiet  in  each  period,  the  debtvr  c'Luntry-  decides  about
consumption,  investment  and  debt  service.  These  rnodels  are
particularly  interesting  because  investment  is  endogenous,  but
they  assume  the  bargaining  away by  giving  the banks'  consortium
all  the  bargaining  power  regarding  debt  rescheduling  proposals.
After  a  first draft  of this paper  was completed,  it came  to our
attention  an  asymmetric  information  bargaining  model  in  Wells
[1990] and an endogenous investment bargaining model  in Cohen and
Verdier  [1989].
5Fernandez-Arias  has  also  touched  on  the  stability  of  the
bank consortium.
2countries are not. Bulow and Rogoff  [19 .b)  present a seminal
bargaining model where players alternate offers and counter offers
in the spirit of Rubinstein's perfect information model
(Rubinstein [1982]). This model has the important feature that
players are treated symmetrically, and therefore no one is given
all the bargaining power . They present a multi-stage bargaining
model in order to model the fact that in actual negotiations
rescheduling agreements are repeatedly recontracted over time.
Still, their constant recontracting model of sovereign debt is
essentially static, in the sense that investment and growth cannot
be endogenously affected by the bargaining process.
This work builds on Bulow and Rogoff's constant recontracting
model. It analyzes the debt negotiations in a formal bargaining
framework without sacrificing the economic analysis of the
debtor's economy. Some key novelties of the additional structure,
related to the macroeconomic model and the dynamics of the game,
are worth mentioning. It features an import-dependent economy
subject to foreign exchange and fiscal constraints. These
constraints affect the external transformation needed to service
foreign debt and the internal transfer of resources needed to
service public debt, respectively. Furthermore, an important
dynamic aspect of the negotiations is addressed by relaxing the
assumption of investment exogeneity and studying the case where
negotiation breakdowns would affect investment and, therefore,
future negotiation environments and outcomes.
6This  is  also  true  in  Fernandez  and  Glazer  and  in
Fernandez-Arias.
3The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
analyzes the economic factors relevant to the study of sovereign
debt negotiations, Section 3 describes the economy and sets up the
model, and Section 4 solves the model. Section 5 analyzes the
equilibrium solution and Section 6 summarizes the main
conclusions.
2. SOVEREIGN DEBT NEGOTIATIONS
An understanding of international debt negotiations starts
from recognizing the crucial difference between domestic and
international lending regarding the enforcement of the debt
contracts. In domestic lending the legal system allows collateral
to be attached, which provides a guarantee for the creditor and an
incentive to comply for the debtor. Insufficient collateral may
lead to debt restructuring and even bargaining, but under normal
circumstances the liquidation value of the collateral can be
7 expected to be enough to assure contract compliance  . The legal
right  that creditors have of appropriating th.e  collateral  if the
debtor does not repay supports domestic lending.
In international lending, by contrast, sovereign immunity
makes the provision of effective collateral almost impossible.
While sovereign immunity would strictly apply only to public debt,
which  is the bulk of all international debt,  it also limits the
7See Hart and Moore  [1989] for an analysis of recontracting
in domestic lending.
4creditors' legal rights related to private debt, because
debtor-country governments retain immense powers such as
nationalizing debt or imposing restrictions on inte-national
payments. The limitations that sovereign immunity imposes on
internationaL '.aw  imply that courts can only attach collateral
located in the creditor's jurisdiction, which, except  in  special
cases such as airplanes, make the provision of collateral too
costly to be included in international debt contracts. In the case
of international lending, the question is not about insolvency or
the debtor's ability to pay, since debt levels are typically below
any measure of the debtor countries' economic possibilities of
transferring resources8. The interesting question is why the
debtor countries might be willing to transfer any amount at all,
as they have been doing for a number of years since the debt
crisis set in, given that international debt contracts include no
9 collateral
The short answer is that the creditor banks retain the power
to hurt  the  debtor  countries  in the case  of  a  dcfaii1 10-  Tha
commercial banking system plays a crucial role in facilitating
However, an attempt to accommodate  a very  large internal transfer
from the  private  sector  to  the public  sector  in order  to  repay
international  debt,  either  by  cutting  spending  or  by  increasing
revenues, might lead to a government fall. To the extent that the
government  does  not have  full command  on the  country's  economic
resources, the government's abil±cy to pay might be binding.
9It is only because debtor  countries  have  some willingness
to pay that international loans have been contracted  in the
first place.
10For  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  costs  of  default  see
Kaletsky[1985],  Alexander  [1987]  and  Bulow  and  Rogoff
(1989b].
5international transactions in world markets, precisely because of
the limitations of international law reaaiding the enforceability
of contracts between parties in different countries. Also,
although the creditor banks do not have the right to seize assets
in the debtor cour.try  jurisdiction, where they are located, they
do have the legal recourse in their own court system to demand and
be granted seizure rights in their own jurisdictions. Since the
banking system is highly integrated and international debt
contracts include cross-default clauses, if confrontational
actions are taken they are likely to be widespread.  As a
consequence, a drastic reduction in access to capital markats and
a cut-off from most international payment mechanisms can be
expected. Trade financing would be reduced and goods  in transit in
the creditors' jurisdiction would be subject to seizure.
The banks can expect to be able to seize a negligible amount
of  assets, since debtor countries would have ample opportunity  to
avoid the jurisdictions and instances where assets are seizable
and circumvent the obstacles  . Debtor countries would be hurt by
sanctions, however, despite avoiding seizures. As a consequence of
default sanctions, new commercial partners would be required and
12 inefficient commercial practices would need to be used  . In
11Iran 1979 is an exception confirming the rule. In this case
assets were frozen for political reasons at a time when Iran
was not planning  to repudiate obligations  and therefore  not
attempting to reduce exposure. Chase Manhattan  Bank declared
default after assets were frozen.
12The argument that the debtor country might also lose some access
to international capital markets in the future is discussed  later.
6summary, default sanctions would essentially translate into
deadweight losses because of the trade  disruption they would
generate, which from the debtor's point of vielw  would be similar
13
to the effect of an abrupt adverse chanae in terms of trade
These potential penalties are a partial substitute for the missing
collateral: they provide some incentives to pay without including
the guarantee value of the collateral liquidation. These costs are
all deadweight costs due to the inefficiency of the default
regime, and for this reason a mutually beneficial negotiation to
avoiding default might be expected. Note, however, that these
losses accrue only  to  the debtor.
An additional important cost associated with a default
situation, which has not received attention so far,takes the form
of reduced output and investment. In fact, the disruption
following default is likely to cause major dislocations  in the
debtor's economy compared to a stable rescheduling regime. One
important aspect is that debtor countries' economies are typically
rigid  economies  whose  productive  structure  is strongly  denendent
on essential imports (both capital and intermediate goods) which
13 Tho  _.iable  e-vid^nce  is consibUenL  witn  tnis  picture.  For
example  Peru  in  1986,  while  preparing  for  being  declared  in
default, deposited cash reserves in more secure locations  (Bank of
International  Settlements)  and  transferred  gold  reserves  from
Switzerland  to  Peru.  The  same  contingency  plan  specified  that
trade would be redirected  through  friendly countries  in order  to
avoid hold title when the goods arrived in unfriendly countrie-. A
loss of 10-15% of value of the total commodity trade was estimated
(see the Andean  Report, March  1986). When Brazil  declared  a debt
moratorium  in  1987,  the  reduction  in  trade  financing  was
immediate. This,  and the  fact that  international  agencies  denied
financial help, forced Brazil to resume payments  (see the New York
T4"imes,  2/22/88).
7may be virtually  impossible to obtain. This would negatively
affect investment and the efficiency with which capital is used.
The magnitude of the problem may make some firmns  so ur  -rofitable
that plant closings would result, thus reducing productive
capacity. Furthermore, the severe dislocation of the relative
profitability of  different sectors in the economy in the context
of an unstable economic environment would not be conducive to
invr"stment  but rather to a wait-and-see strategy.
The relative importance of direct default sanctions of the
kind mentioned above in providing incentives to pay and supporting
international lending has been stressed by Bulow and Rogoff
(1989a). In their article, the authors show that under certain
conditions of total absence of direct sanctions, the debtor's
concern for how his reputation for repayment might affect the
24 availability of fu.ture  loans cannot sustain any len'ing  . From a
more practical point of view, in the current crisis, reputation
reasons are not likely to be relatively important because debtor
governments cannot expect to receive positive net transfers until
very far in the future, and therefore any future gain associated
with being a good borrower should be deeply discounted.
Consequently, for both theoretical and practical reasons, it
appears to be a reasonable approximation to neglect reputation
incentives.
14They show that there is no subgame perfect equilibrium of the
infinite game exhibiting positive lending. Therefore banks would
never lend.
8When there is a debt crisis the market value of debt falls
below its contractual value  (that is, there is a positive discount
in the secondary market). In this case, even if hanks are
perfectly competitive, competition breaks down and the creditor
banks acquire monopoly power vis  a  vis  the debtor country. This is
because creditor banks make a negative expected rate of return ex
post  (reflected in the market discount) and new loans would not
obtain a better return by virtue of the seniority structure, which
implies that no new bank would step in. In effect, pari  passu
provisions and negative senioritl clauses in international debt
contracts assuire  that all banks' claims are equally senior and, in
combination wit' cross-default clauses, have helped the banks to
coordinate and form a consortium after the crisis erupted. To
simplify, the bank consortium will be taken as a single agent and
the internal bargaining will be neglected by assuming that the
bank members divide the collections  in proportion to exposure.
Therefore in a debt crisis the relations between the creditor
banks and the debtor country can be characterized as a bilateral
monopoly bargaining situation, where the bank consortium attempts
to extract the maximum expected present value of net transiers
from the debtor.
The maximum present value of net transfers which could be
extracted through bargaining can be characterized as the shadow
market value of the debt. When this shadow value is less than the
contractual value, it becomes the actual market value  (positive
market discount) and a debt crisis with credit rationing and
bargaining  is the relevant framework. In this rationing regime
9which characterizes debt crises, any new lending would only be
made by existing creditors on an involuntary basis in order to
obtain the best negotiation outcome. When the shadow value is not
less than the contractual value, then the actual market value is
the contractual value  (no  market discount), and no bargaining
takes place. Therefor., from an ex  ante  point of view, the shadow
market value equals the debtor's credit ceiling, beyond which
credit rationing would occur. The study of the negotiated
transfers supporting the shadow value is useful ror both the
determination of the ex  ante  credit ceiling and for the
characterization of a debt crisis, once the credit ceiling has
been surpassed ex  post.
In anticipation of the possibility of a debt crisis and ex
post  negative profits, banks charge a country-risk premium on
their loans  (obtaining zero expected profits assuming perfect
competition). Lacking formal enforcement mechanisms,  in the event
of a debt crisis, debt obligations are subject to renegotiation
depending on the bargaining conditions prevalent when obligations
are due. The formal terms of the contract, however, are relevant:
since the banks need to abide by the rule of law in order to have
legal rights and bargaining power, they cannot possibly extract
forced payments above the ones contractually stipulated. It is
perhaps not surprising, therefore, that loans are made short term
despite the fact that under normal circumstances they are expected
15-lahsrtg
to be rescheduled and rolled over  . With this short-leash strategy
15The issue of how maturity and risk premia relate is not addressed
here.  It is simply noted  that commercial  debt  is typically  short
10eac1 bank minimizes the risk of receiving little or no payment at
a time when they would like to withdraw as much as possible.
Negotiations between the banks' consortium and each country
in the context of a debt crisis can be schematically described as
follows  The banks abide by the rule of law because otherwise they
would lose the possibilivv of applying legal sanctions. The
country, however, does not have this constraint and can
renegotiate its obligations in any period. Therefore, without loss
of generality,  renegotiations seeking a rescheduling agreement can
be assumed to take place in every period if the constraint is
established that the outcome cannot be detrimental to the country,
compared to complying with the original schedule in the current
period. This is so because the country can always choose to adhere
to the original schedule and comply with the obligation due in the
16 current period  ,  in which case there would not be any meaningful
rescheduling  (formally, the rescheduling agreement would coincide
with the original schedule).
If no rescheduling agreement is reached in the current
period, no transfer is made and default sanctions are applied in
17 the current period  . If a rescheduling agreement is reached in
maturity  debt. Managerial  compensation  s  emes  resulting  in deep
discounting  of the future and "herding" are probably  important in
this respect.
16It  will  be  later  shown  that  this  option  of  adhering  to  the
original  schedule  is  irrelevant  and  not  binding  under  the
assumptions.
17If direct gains from seizures are larger than the legal costs of
imposing sanctions, the incentive for applying sanctions  is clear.
Otherwise, as we will see, there are many equilibria  in this game
11the current period, a transfer is made and default sanctions are
averted in the current period. In both cases, a new renegotiation
starts next period. As revealed by the large discounts at which
the international debt is quoted in the secondary market, the
marginal value of nominal debt is extremely low. This suggests
that countries will not regain access to voluntary lending in the
foreseeable future and, therefore, that it is a reasonable
approximation to assume that debt renegotiations will go on
forever.
It is crucial for the understanding of this analysis to
realize that rescheduling agreements need not be explicit to avert
the application of default sanctions. If obligations do not fall
in arrears, default sanctions would not be applied because the
banks would not have the legal right to do it. If obligations do
fall in arrears, although the banks would have the legal right to
declare the country in default they may choose not to do so. For
this to happen the banks simply have to accept the current
payment, which is  made in exchange for their abstention  from
applying the default sanctions they are entitled to (in the
current period). Protracted negotiations and arrears do not
necessarily imply that default sanctions are being applied,
neither in this model nor in reality. Typically, debtor countries
transfer positive amounts to banks and banks do not apply default
sanctions, irrespective of the arrears situation which might have
depending  on  the  level  of  sanctions  applied.  The  equilibrium
where  sanctions are not applied  is not  interesting  because  there
would  not be any collection  arid,  a fortiori,  any lending  in the
first place.
12developed. This paper argues that the threat of default sanctions
causes the debtor countries to transfer amounts substantial enough
so as to make them acceptable to banks, which results in >. ztions
not being actually applied.
If an explicit rescheduling agreement is reached, that is a
new contract is signed, then, typically, current service is paid
and a partially offsetting loan is contracted. In this case the
current net transfer amounts to the interest payment minus the net
capital inflow (fresh money), and future obligations  are
determined according to the terms of the new contract. If an
implicit rescheduling agreement is reached, that is no new
contract is signed, some payment is made in the current period and
the unmet contractual obligations  (if any) fall in arrears. In
this case the current net transfer amounts to the payment made and
future obligations.  are determined according to the provisions of
the original contract and the associated legal treatment of
arrears (if any). In the context of this paper, and arguably in
reality, only the actual stream of net transfers that debtor
countries make is relevant, as opposed to the legal distinction
between signing rescheduling agreements or running arrears. A
situation of a partial payment with arrears accumulation  is
equivalent to a rescheduling agreement specifying a net transfer
equal to that partial payment in the current period and a future
schedule identical to the one resulting from the accumulation of
arrears under the original contract.
In a negotiation attempting to reach a settlement, default
13costs have to be weighted against the cost of the agreed net
transfer payment. Four dimensions are relevant to the
determination of this latter cost. First, there is the present
consumption foregone due to the additional savings which have to
be generated in order to meet current payments.  Second, the
transformation of domestic resources into international currency
through the corresponding increase in net exports, needed to
service external debt, may prove exceedingly costly if larger net
18 export volumes lead to decreasing returns on domestic resources
Third, the internal transfer of resources from the private sector
to the government, needed to service public debt, may impose
additional costs in terms of political stability  (particularly if
government spending suffers) and distortions  imposed on the
economy if an effort to increase revenues is made.  Fourth, there




Neqotiations are represented as follows. The bank consortium
(the bank) and a debtor country (the debtor) bargain over debt
repayments. In each period  (of  duration h) the parties are assumed
to bargain over the current net transfer  making alternating
offers and counter offers, like in a standard Rubinstein-like
Aor example, if  export expansion leads to lower international
prices or higher domestic costs of production.
14bargaining game. Specifically, suppose that at any time t the bank
makes a net transfer offer bt. If the debtor accepts the offer,
the payment is instantly made. By yielding to the bank's offer the
debtor gives the bank the opportunity to offer again next period,
that is at time t+h.  If the debtor rejects the offer, default
sanctions are applied. By resisting the bank's offer, the debtor
earns the opportunity to make a counter offer dt+h at time t+h.
This process continues forever.
Similarly, suppose that at any time t the debtor makes a net
transfer offer dt. If the bank accepts the offer, the payment is
instantly made. By yielding to the debtor's offer the bank gives
the debtor the opportunity to offer again next period, that is at
time t+h.  If the bank rejects the offer, default sanctions are
applied. By resisting the debtor's offer, the bank earns the
opportunity to maka a counter offer bt+h at time t+h.
This set up is similar to Rubinstein's perfect information
game in that it is a model of bilateral negotiation, that is no
party is given all the bargaining power, where the parties suffer
a loss over time if they do not agree. In contrast, however, this
game is a multi-stage game where the debt reschedulhd  is
indefinitely recontracted over time 9. In this respect the game is
in the spirit of  the constant recontracting model  introduced in
Bulow and Rogoff  [1989b]. Unlike Bulow and Rogoff's model,  this
19In  the bargaining  theory  jargon, there  is  a  potentially
infinite number  of pies  becoming available  over  time which
are  to  be  successively  divided:  once  a  pie  is  divided,
another one comes along.
15game is inherently dynamic in that the environment  in which the
players bargain  (the productive potential of the economy) is
endogenously affected by the negotiation outcomes in a way to be
later described.
It is assumed that debt obligations, both interest payments
and amortizations, are due in full in eachi  period. This assumption
reflects the relatively short maturity of commercial loans when
the debt crisis started and some efficiency characteristics  of the
equilih-rium  outcome of the bargaining game which will be discussed
later. This assumption, however, is not critical. All that is
needed is that obligations in any given period are not less than
the bargaining solution  (and therefore binding for the bank).
Under this assumption, any rescheduling agreement would entail a
current transfer not exceeding the one specified in the original
schedule. If no rescheduling agreement is reached, either implicit
or explicit, no transfer is made and default sanctions are applied
in the current period. All the resulting outstanding debt,
including debt resulting from arrears, is due next period, when it
is again renegotiated, etc.
Since the bank abides by the rule of law, the terms at which
the debt is rescheduled are binding for the bank. It is assumed
that the banks are not in a position to make rescheduling
agreements contingent on investment, whose unverifiability may
20 prevent banks from coordinating and committing to such a scheme
20Complex reputation-like strategies could sustain these contracts
implicitly, but they do not appear to be relevant in actual
16It will be further assumed that the game is not played on the
wrong side of a  debt Laffer curve  (i.e. the incentive effect of
future payments on investment is not strong enough to justify
21 unilateral reductions in contractual debt service)  . Assuming
that the debtor country's rate of time preference exceeds the
world  interest rate, it will be apparent that, in this model,
prepayments  (that is larger payments in exchange for smaller
scheduled payments in the next periods) would not be efficient and
would not be part of the equilibrium. Therefore  it can be safely
assumed that the bank will make certain that the amount of its
contractual claim is not binding. This justifies the assumption
that the contractual obligation in each period is large enough
that the right to pay in full is not a relevant option  for the
debtor.
The existence of a debt crisis indicates that outstanding
debt is larger than the expected present value of the negotiated
payments, still to be determined. Alternatively,  this expected
present value can be seen as the maximum amount that can be
extracted from countries, thus determining a  (ex  ante)  ceiling on
international lending. To simplify, it is assumed that there is no
negotiations. The markovian refinement which will be used for
equilibrium selection will imply that bargaining strategies do not
depend on historical events except insofar as they have a direct
effect on the economy. This forward-looking restriction will  imply
that promises made by the bank to the effect of abstaining from
collecting all they could, depending on investment, will not be
honored, and therefore contingent payments will be ruled out on
theoretical grounds too.
21Once this case is solved and the bargaining solution found, the
possibility of mutually beneficial reduced contractual debt
service can be explored.
1722 uncertainty  . Without uncertainty it makes sense to assume that
22 In reality, the effect of sanctions is highly and equally
uncertain to both parties. This feature can be easily included as
in Fernandez-Arias  (1989] without changing the qualitative  results
(in this model, the unknown sanction should be replaced by its
expected value).
18the negotiation process will go on forever, because if it were
known that at some point the capitalized debt would sell at par,
there would not be a debt crisis to begin with.  Under these
assumptions, the exact terms of rescheduling are irrelevant and
will not be addressed.
Economy
The economy will be characterized in terms of a set of
parameters in a linear structure. Some of these parameters  refer
to relations between flow variables and the capital stock and are
therefore dependent on the length of the time period used for
measuring flows. The period considered is of duration h. Since h
will be later considered as a variable, the dependence on h is
made explicit by linearly scaling the flow-capital stock
parameters. For convenience of language these parameters will be
interpreted taking h as unity  (i.e. if the parameter relating
exports to capital is xh, x will be referred to as the
exports-to-capital ratio)
For simplicity, the domestic economy is assumed to produce a
single good, which can be absorbed domestically  (that is invested
23 or consumed domestically) or exported  . Let °t be real
2 3The distinction between tradeable and non-tradeable sectors has
been analyzed elsewhere  (see for example Aizenman  [1987]), where
it is shown that the strategic aspects of the debt negotiations
may distort the investment allocation across sectors. Here such a
distinction would complicate matters without adding much to the
aspects this paper focuses on, and therefore all domestic
production is assumed to be exportable.
19domestically produced output  (after some choice of units).
Domestic output is either used for domestic absorption  (At) or for
exporting  (Xt). By definition:
[1]  0t = At+Xt
Let international dollar prices in constant dollar terms
(that is, deflated by dollar inflation) of imported goods and of
domestically produced goods be PM and pX respectively.  Let Pt
stand for debt payments in period t, also in constant dollar
terms. The whole analysis can be conducted in terms of dollars
only because it is assumed that real exchange rates among
currencies in which international debt is denominated remain
constant over time.
It is assumed that world conditions are expected to be
stationary. It is also assumed that the debtor country is a small
economy, and therefore it has no effect on the import price PM.
Then PM is constant over time and is normalized to pM=l by a
suitable choice of import units. Therefore real imports in period
t, Mt, are equal to their constant dollar equivalent.  In the
exports market the country is not small, however, because products
24 from different countries are imperfect substitutes  . In order to
reflect increasing costs in transforming domestic resources  into
foreign currency, which appears to be a characteristic of many
rigid underdeveloped economies, it is assumed that the price of
24Note that this argument does not apply to imports because the
country represents a small share of each exporting country.
20exports is also constant but only until a certain point, beyond
which it drops sharply making it unprofitable to expand further.
This kink is assumed to occur when the exports-to-capital  ratio
reaches a certain value x25. Units are chosen such that in the
relevant range pX=l as well, and therefore real exports are also
equal to their constant dollar equivalent.
26
In this economy imports are used for domestic absorption
Imported goods  (Mt) are absorbed domestically in combination with
the domestically produced goods At.  In order to keep things
simple it will be assumed that imported goods can be substituted
by domestic goods for absorption purposes at a constant rate e.
The substitution rate e is assumed to be such that the country
obtains gains from international trade by substituting  imports for
domestic output, that is e>1. Let Ct be real consumption and It be
real domestic investment, the two components of domestic
absorption, measured in domestic output units. Then:
(2]  Ct+It =  At+eMt, e>l
The assumption that e>l implies that the country makes
positive gains from trade at the margin. This means  that the
country has a foreign exchange constraint, in the sense that the
country would like to expand exports at the prevailing prices but
will not do it because of the drop in returns. Equivalently,  the
25This extreme assumption is made to simplify but is not critical.
26Intermediate inputs can be easily included.
21expansion of net exports to accommodate debt payments is
exceedingly coztly in terms of domestic output. Based on this
marginal characterization,  (e-1) will be interpreted as a measure
of the foreign exchange constraint. In this simple linear model
this measure also relates to average gains from trade, but the
marginal interpretation is the relevant one (similar results can
be obtained in a more complicated model with decreasing returns to
net exports). In this model, the existence of a foreign exchange
constraint implies that exports will reach their maximum. Then:
[3]  Xt =xhKt
For simplicity, in this model the capital stock is held fixed
during discrete intervals. To simplify notation these intervals
are made to coincide with the bargaining rounds, which as
described before .aave  length h. Capital depreciates at a rate k.
Then:
[4]  K4t  =  K4.(l-kh)+It
The technology  is linear ,  that is it exhibits a constant
capital-to-output ratio, which reflects technological  rigidity and
relative abundance of labor inputs. The gross capital efficiency
with which output is produced, however, as measured by the
capital-to-output ratio, depends on the distortions that the debt
27 crisis introduces in the economy through public policy  . It is
27An alternative  interpretation could be that debt payments
entail  political  costs,  which  for the  government  point  of
22assumed  that  when  a  payment  is made,  the  government  is forced  to
increase revenues through mechanisms which have a distorting
effect on output efficiency, such as anti-technical taxes or
inflationary financing. This cost is assumed to be a fraction f of
the payment made. Since the cost of external payments in terms of
domestic output is magnified by the factor e, additional revenues
measured in domestic output units are similarly magnitied.  Let Pt
stand for the share of the payment service in installed capital
(that is, Pt-pthKt). Assuming that in the absence of payments the
inverse of the capital-to-output ratio is v and that the adverse
output effect is proportional to the additional revenues28 ,  output
can be written as:
[5]  °t =  (v-fept)hKt, f>o, where by definition Pt=pthKt.
In the case of sanctions, in principle the country could take
a  number of defensive measures which could reduce the export
volume. To simplify, however, it is assumed that in that event the
best course of action for the country is to continue trading
internationally by exporting the same amounts and suffering losses
from rerouting, as opposed to storing exportable goods to be
shipped after sanctions are lifted or consumina them while
29 sanctions are in effect  . This assumption is consistent with the
view are equivalent to reductions in output.
28This implies that aside from the payments on foreign debt, public
policy has a constant imp.ict  on the productive efficiency of the
economy as measured by the coefficient v. One justification may be
that the relative size of the State in the economy remains
constant.
29In Bulow and Rogoff's terminology, the punishment-constrained
23fact that the economy suffers from a foreign exchange constraint,
particularly if critical imported investxent goods become not
available, as it will be suggested later.
For simplicity,  it is assumed that international reserves are
held fixed 30,  and therefore exports exactly finance imports and
(net) payments. It is assumed that the only payments made are
those related to commercial debt; in particular  zero net capital
flight is assumed. In the context of this model, once the
investment decision is made and capital accumulated, the export
volume next period is determined. The available import volume  is
then determined by the net payments which have to be financed.
Two scenarios for the balance of payments at time t are
considered:
Case 1.  A rescheduling agreement is reached.  In this case
a net payment Pt (in constant dollar terms) is made and no default
sanction is applied. Then
(6]  Xt =  Mt+Pt
Case 2.  A rescheduling agreement is not reached.  In this
case no net payment is made  (Pt=0) and default sanctions are
applied.
region, as opposed to the bargaining or the autarky regions, is
assumed to be the relevant region
30Reserves  proportional  to  trade  volume  can  be  easily
incorporated.
24As explained before, default sanctions have the main effect
of disrupting trade by making  international transactions more
costly.  In particular, the effect of sanctions is put as an
adverse change in the terms of trade because of the inefficient
trade mechanisms that r2ed to be used. Let the terms of trade
shock be  measured by the factor q applied to the original terms of
trade, where qsl. In the extreme case that q=1 the country manages
to circumvent sanctions costlessly; otherwise there is a real
loss. Then:
[6'] Mt =  qXt  , qsl
To close this reduced-form model an equation determining
investment is needed. The economy to be modeled is one where
private agents play a crucial role and impose severe constraints
on public policy. For this reason the government will be assumed
to have relatively inefficient instruments at its disposal to
affect the market-determined domestic investment ,  with the
implication that investment will not be assumed to be ontimal  frnm
the point of view of the government. Other bargaining models  in
the literature have specified that the investment rate (or the
rate of growth of the economy) is exogenously given, which amounts
to assuming away the dynamic implications of the bargaining
process. There are three interesting sources of investment
endogeneity in the context of this bargaining game: the incentive
effect related to the debt overhang, the liquidity effect related
to current transfer payments, and the disruption effect related to
25the application of default sanctions.
Incentive effects discouraging current investment would arise
from the return-reducing future taxation of domestic capital
needed to finance future  iet  payments in order to service the
debt. Liquidity effects discouraging current investment would
arise from the increase in the cost of funds due to the savings
needed to cover current net payments and perhaps the increase in
the relative price of investment goods if their import component,
substituted at a loss (e-l), is sufficiently important. The first
effect points to the volume of the outstanding debt  (the debt
overhang) and the second effect points to the current debt
service. There is no consensus about the relevance of these
effects, however. Their importance has been forcefully emphasized
by Krugman [1988, 1989] and Sachs [1988, 1989] among others. Bulow
and Rogoff  [1990]  however, argue that low investment in Latin
America is best seen not as a consequence of the debt crisis but
as symptom of the underlying economic shocks which caused the debt
crisis.
Debt overhang effects would be reflected in an investment
rate dependent on the expectation of future repayments.  As long
as  the debt overhang distortion is not as powerful as to place
the parties on the wrong side of the so-called debt Laffer curve,
it can be incorporated in this model. Liquidity effects might
introduce interesting considerations into the game, because  in
that case, in contrast to the case where growth is exogenously
given or only affected by the debt overhang, the bank might choose
26not to extract all it could in the current period in order to
improve the future potential of the economy, and therefore  future
31 payments  . The choice was made not to include these two effects,
which would break the linearity of the model, and rather
concentrate on a more subtle underlying effect, which will be
termed disruption effect.
To maintain linearity, barring liquidity and debt overhang
effects, it will be assumed that in the absence of sanctions
investment is a constant fraction s of installed capacity.
Therefore payments would be absorbed by consumption. Then:
[7]  It = shKt
In the case of default sanctions there are other channels
through which the economic environment may be affected, whose
effects will be calied disruption effects. The disruption due to
the sanctions is likely to cause major dislocations in the
economy, particularly because of its reliance on essential imports
which may be virtually  impossible to obtain.
In order to reflect the feature that the degree of
substitutability between domestic and imported goods for
investment purposes may decrease sharply when core imported
capital goods are scarce, which seems to be relevant in many
underdeveloped countries, it is  assumed that after some point no
3 1 This  statement  assumes  that  strategies  do  not  depend  on
past payments.
27further perfect substitution at the rate e is possible32.
Specifically, it is assumed that there are core imports which are
needed to support an investment ratio s  3.  If these essential
imports are not obtained, the resulting substitution and
relocation of investment leads to an investment ratio possibly
lower than s. If sanctions are not too severe, critical imports
are financeable, s'=s and equation  [71 holds under sanctions too.
If sanctions are severe enough, however,  critical imports are
affected  and  s'<s.  Then  s-cs.  Let A=s-st>O  be the  reduction  in
investment due to the disruption effect. Then:
[7'  ]  It  =  (s-h  )hKt ,  A>O
No attempt is made here to endogenously derive these
particular relationships from a more structural model based on
private agents' optimization. They should be seen as a convenient
way to parameterize the relationships discussed above. If
sanctions are not applied or if they are not effective  (x=O, the
economy is completely closed; q=l, sanctions are costlessly
circumvented) then the economy grows at the exogenous rate s-k.
If effective sanctions are applied the reduction in the growth
rate is AhO and the economy grows at the rate s-k-A.
To simplify notation, let g=s-k be the growth rate when
32Very imperfect substitution is a key characteristic of two-gap
models.
33This implicitly assumes that the range of payments to consider is
such that they are never so costly as to prevent the financing of
core imports.
28agreement is reached and g'=s'-k=g-A be the growth  rate when
sanctions are applied.  Let z=l+gh and  t'=l+g'h  be the
corresponding growth factors per period. It will be later
justified that in equilibrium default sanctions would not be
applied, which  implies that two cases can be distinguished at time
t:
i) An agreement to pay Pt=pthKt is reached at time t.
Then the system formed by equations  [1,2,3,4,5,6,7] prevails.
By successive substitution, current consumption and capital
accumulation can be obtained:
(I  ct/hKt  =  (n-g-pt)+(e-1)x-(e-1)pt-fept
c-e(l+f)pt
(II)  Kt+h =Kt
whure n=v-k is the net output-to capital ratio, c=n-g+(e-l)x is
the consumption-to-capital ratio with no payments, Kt is
predetermined and Pt is -o  be determined.
In this case the consumption-to-capital ratio can be
decomposed in four terms. The first term reflects the domestic
product identity without adjustments for the presence of foreign
exchange and fiscal constraints  (that is, taking e=l and f=O,
respectively). It equals net domestic output  (n) adjusted by net
investment (g) and the trade balance surplus (Pt). The second term
2934
is the gains from trade in terms of current absorption  The
third term is the additional cost imposed by the foreign exchange
constraint on the external debt payment in terms of consumption,
that is the associated loss in gains from trade, at the rate
(e-l).  The fourth term is the efficiency cost of debt payments due
to the fiscal constraint, at the rate fe.
The effect of the external payment can be thought of in three
cumulative steps: the direct cost in dollars (Pt), a first
indirect cost on top of Pt due to the foreign exchange constraint,
which magnifies the direct cost in domestic output units
((e-l)pt), leading to a total cost of ept, and a second indirect
cost on top of ept due to the fiscal constraint, which magnifies
the cost in domestic output units because of inefficiencies in the
extraction of these additional revenues  (fept), leading to a total
cost e(l+f)pt. Rearranging, the same ratio can be decomposed  in
two terms: one that would prevail if no external payments were
made, c, and another one accounting for the total cost of the
external vayment, e(l+f)p,. Note that in the absence of both
foreign exchange and fiscal constraints, this total cost collapses
to the direct cost Pt.
ii) No agreement is reached at time t.
Then no payment is made  (Pt=pthKt=0) and the system formed by
equations  [1,2,3,4,5,6',7'] prevails.  By successive substitution
current consumption and capital accumulation can be obtained:
34Gains from trade are potentially larger because trade allows to
sustain larger investment rates.
30(I')  Ct/hKt  =  c-(l-q)ex+A
(II')  Kt+h  -
where Kt is predetermined.
In the case of sanctions, the consumption-to-capital  ratio
can be decomposed in three terms. The first term corresponds to
the consumption that would prevail if no sanctions were applied or
they were completely ineffective (q=l and, therefore, A=O). This
term is identical to the analogous decomposition of  (I)  when no
payments are made, which makes sense because both situations would
be identical. The second term accounts for the cost of the
sanctions in terms of domestic output due to the adverse change  in
terms of trade.  The third term corresponds to the potential
increase in current.  consumption due to the decline in total
domestic investment due to the disruption effect.
Correspondingly,  in the case of sanctions, capital grows at a
possibly  lower  gross  rate  7'.
Objective Functions
The internal bargaining within the banks' consortium  is
35 assumed away by representing the consortium as a single agent
Similarly, the debtor country's objective function is represented
35The possible  relevance for the negotiations of the threat
of forming a debtor countries' cartel is also neglected. See
Fernandez-Arias  [1989] for a treatment of this issue.
31by a present discounted expression of domestic consumption. This
implies that the debtor government has very simplistic objectives
and faces no trade-offs among competing groups, which amounts to
assuming away the political complexities of fiscal problems and
austerity programsJ°.
The banks' consortium objective function at time t,  Bt, is
the present discounted value of  the stream of payments  {Pt . Since
those payments are in constant dollars, the discount rate is the
real riskless rate r. Then:
Bt= 0 6o  t+jh  where  3=l/(l+rh)
For tractability reasons, in order to obtain a closed-form
solution, the debtor country's objective function at time t, Dt,
will be approximated as the present value of the stream of real
consumption  (C  t.  The discount rate i may reflect not only the
government's rate of impatience but also the population growth
rate to the extent that the government cares about per-capita
consumption. Then:
D.F.  =  0  63C  t+Jh  where 6=1/(l+ih)
As will be seen later, if the real riskless rate does not
36Alternatively, the inefficiency cost measured by f can be thought
as representing a wedge between the government's evaluation and a
desired social evaluation  (as seen by an IFI, for example). The
implications of distortions in the government's objective function
will be analyzed in a separate piece.
32exceed the exogenous growth rate of the economy  (rsg)  the credit
ceiling is unbounded and there would not be a debt crisis. Xt is
assumed therefore that growth is Jower than the riskless interest
rate  (r>g), or equivalently, Oz<l. To sharpen some results it is
assumed that the debtor is more impatient than the bank, that is
i>r, which is a reasonable assumption since governments are
typically very impatient and, furthermore, c includes the
population growth rate. In this model i>r also provides a
rationale for the debtor's willingness to borrow at the rate r for
consumption tilting. Noting that gag', it holds true that
i>r>gZg', which implies that in terms of discount  factors (3, jl',
Si  and 67' are all smaller than 1.
Equilibrium Concept
In this game, each player's pure strategy specifies that
player's  (deterministic) move at each point in time as a function
of the history of the game. The bank offers to agree on an payment
pt= bt to which the debtor responds with "Yes" or "No",  and the
debtor offers to agree on a payment Pt=dt to which the bank
responds with "Yes" or "No", where t=O,h,2h,...  A party earns the
opportunity  of  making  a  counter  offer  next  period  by  rejecting  an
offer  and  gives  the  other  party  an  opportunity  to  make  another
offer  next  period  by  accepting  an  offer.  A  pure  strategy
specifies  which  offer  or  reply  should  be  selected,  depending  on
whose turn it is, as a function of the history of 'the  game.
A Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is a pair of pure
33strategies, one for each player, such that neither player can
improve its objective function by unilaterally changing its
strategy (including stochastic mixtures of pure strategies). As is
customary, attention will be restricted to Nash equilibria  in pure
strategies.
A history-independent strategy is one in which there is no
effective dependence on history. A Markov-Nash  equilibrium  (MNE)
is a Nash equilibrium where strategies depend on history only
through a set of state variables. In this game it is natural to
make replies contingent on the offer received in that same periud.
Apart from that obvious dependence, it is plausible to consider
the capital stock Kt as the state variable, since it summarizes
~37 the economic environment in which the game is played3.  This
markovian refinement  is the natural generalization of the spirit
of the history independence refinement to a game where the
physical environment changes over time. The justification of these
refinements is simplicity: each continuation equilibrium  of the
game at the beginning of any period depends only on the game the
players have ahead. Therefore pure strategies in an MNE are of the
form bt5b[Kt] and  dt=d[Kt], and similarly for the responses at
time t, which depend on the offer received and Kt. It is easy to
check that, as a consequence, all subgame equilibrium payoffs at
the beginning of each period depend only on the capital stock and
whose turn it is to offer.
3 7Here  calendar  time  per  se  is  irrelevant  because  of  the
stationary structure of this infinite game. In a finite game
-r1  endar  time  would  be relevant in the remaining part of the
game and should also be included as a state variable.
34A subgame-perfect Markov-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
in this game is a MNE in pure strategies which is so in any
subgame  (i.e. in the remaining of the game)  . Subgame perfection
can be interpreted as restricting strategies to those which are ex
post  optimal, and therefore ruling out incredible threats which
would not be carried out ex post.  In this game it means that
players attempt to maximize Bt and Dt at every t.
The equilibrium concept in this model will be subgame-perfect
Markov-Nash equilibrium  in puire  strategies, which  is a standard
refinement in games like this. To sharpen results and ensure
uniqueness attention will be restricted to linear offer strategies
(i.e. b[Kt]=bhKt and d[Kt]-dhKt). Another way to characterize this
equilibrium concept is by noting that attention is being
restricted to strategies where Pt is history-independent  (it is
either b or d). It is easy to check that because both the economic
variables and the payoff  functions are linear functions of
installed capacity, an equilibrium in linear strategies  leads to
linear subgame payoffs.
The justification for this constant-return-to-capital
assumption is four-fold. First, equilibria of all other reJated
bargaining models in the debt literature exhibit this
characteristic, and for this reason it is important to select this
equilibrium as a benchmark. Second, it represents a neutral
standpoint for the study of how the size of the economy might
affect the outcome, which is one of the questions to be addressed.
35Third, the same equilibrium can be obtained by applying other
38 refinements common in the debt literature  . In fact, if the game
is truncated by assuming that after some final date there will be
no more rescheduling, then at that point the players would bargain
over a final payment like in a Rubinstein's game.  Considering the
limiting case where the final date is arbitrarily  far in the
future leads to the same equilibrium seleption 39. Fourth, linear
strategies can be justified on the grounds of simplicity,  like the
markovian refinement and the exclusion of mixed strategies.
4. EQUILIBRIUM
Let D. -D (Kt,bt] be the debtor's equilibrium  expected payoff
if it accepts an offer bt at time t and let Dt  RDR[Kt]  be the
debtor's equilibrium expected payoff if it rejects it, which in
this game is independent of bt. Similarly, let BtA=BA[Kt,dt] be
the bank's equilibrium expected payoff if it accepts an offer dt
nRR
at time t and let B R=BR[Kt] be the bank's equilibrium  expected t  (~
payoff if it rejects it, which is also independent of dt. Note
that these payoff variables are defined only when the
corresponding player receives an offer.
A subgame-perfect Markov-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
in this game can be characterized by the equilibrium  offer
38As in Bulow-Rogoff's constant recontracting model.
39This can be checked by solving for the final payment (which
turns  out  to  be  linear  in capital)  and  applying  backward
induction.
36functions bLKt) and d(Kt] and the corresponding reply .unctions in
terms of the offer received and installed capacity Kt. With linear
strategies an equilibrium is characterized by the two scalars b
and d in the linear offer functions b[Kti-bhKt and d[Kt]-dhKt, and
the reply functions. The equilibrium pt=b* and pt=d* satisfy the
system:
DA(Kt,b] - DR Kt] and
BA[Kt,d]  - BR [Ktl
for all t for which they are defined.
To see this, suppose that in period t it is the bank's turn
to make an offer. Because of the markovian assumption and the fact
that after a rejection capital grows at the fixed rate 1',  the
debtor's payoff in case of a rejection, Dt  R, depends only on Kt
and not on the offer bt. Also, DtA is monotonically decreasing  in
bt because future payments after an acceptance are independent of
the accepted offer bt, since in this case capital grows at the
fixed rate z.  This establishes a fixed maximum acceptahle nroposal
*  ~~A  R bt  such that Dt =DR  Turning to the reply function, subgane t  t  ~~~t
perfection implies that offers below bt  are accepted and those
above  are rejected,  since,  respectivelv,  rn*ic$tion  woclld  W0  'r3G
and better. In equilibrium the bank should not offer less than
this because it could do better by offering slightly more and
still having the offer accepted. It should not offer more either.
Since in that case the debtor would suffer the default costs and
still get the relatively high utility level Dt  R  the bank is bound
to be worse off. Simi1arly,  when it is the debtor's turn to make
37*  ~~~~~~A  R  40 an offer, d  is determined such that Bt =Bt . Subgame
t 
perfection  implies that these conditions hold in every period.
The players' equilibrium responses to offers in that
equilibrium are such that the points bt  and dt  are cut-off
values dividing the acceptance and rejection regions. At those
points there is indifference, but equilibrium strategies have to
specify acceptance  (otherwise no offer would be a best response
because any offer could be improved by offering closer to the
cut-off level). Therefore, in equilibrium, offers are accepted
immediately and default sanctions are never applied, which appears
41  -tc  htee
to be a realistic implication of the model  . Nrtice that even
though sanctions are not applied, they represent a credible threat
which actually determine the negotiated payment level.
In equilibrium agreement is reached in all future periods,
which implies that installed oapacity is expected to grow at the
exogenous rate  - from the next period onwards. In the current
period  it grows  at the  rate  7 or 7' depending  on whether  the
current offer is accepted or rejected, respectively. Equilibrium
payoffs at time t can be obtained  from the systems  (I)-(II) and
40This reasoning assumes that both players prefer the resulting
solution to never  gree. Otherwise the equilibrium corresponds to
a corner solution where the player who would prefer not to agree
obtains a utility-equivalent settlement.  It will be later checked
the conditions under which this interior solution holds.
41Since  agreements  may  be  implicit,  the  only  factual
implication  is that  sanctions  are  not  applied.  This  is  a
reflection  of  the  symmetric  information  assumption  in the
model. For a model with asymmetric information and agreement
delays  (and presumably  sanctions  being  applied,  although
this is not made explicit) see Wells  (1990).
38(I')-(II')  rdepending  on whether the current offer is accepted or
rejected. In the case of the debtor it is the present value of the
consumption stream at the debtor's rate of discount; in the case
of the bank it is the present value of the stream of payments at
the world real interest rate. Recall that in period t the bank
makes equilibrium offers bhKt and the debtor makes equilibrium
offers dhK  t. Since in equilibrium offers are accepted, the party
who  makes the opening offer can be expected to make all the
offers. Then:
DA Dt  =  6o3(c-e(1+f)b)h7x3K
DR  (c-(l-q)ex+A)hKt + b4_6J3(c-e(1+f)d)hT3(-'Kt)
At  -7 0I  'dh7  Kt
t  = 
B  ° +  . 63bhz](T'K t  =  t
where j=0,1,2,...
Applying the equilibrium conditions D  =DtR  and Bt BtR
recalling that T-7'=Ah, and simplifying the common factor hT  1-he
equilibrium linear system for b and d is obtained:
(8]  b =  67'd +  (1-6T)(1-q)x/(l+f)  + A(c6h-(1-6z))/e(l+f)
[9]  d =  gz'b
Substituting, the system can be easily solved for the
39equilibrium b  and d  . Some results are considerably simplified if
bargaining rounds are very short. First-mover advantages are also
removed, since b  and d  have a common limit n.  As h-0, all of
6,0,z,71 converge to 1, l-61(i-g)h,  l-I32(r-g)h, l-6z1z(i-g')h,
1-63';(r-g')h and 1_-32-;t'  (r+i-2g')h.  In this limiting case the
rates i, r, g and g' are instantaneous rates and the flow
variables are densities. Then the limit of the payment b  or d
is:
(i-g)(l-q)x +  A(n-i+  (e-l)x)/e
[10]  iT  =
(l+f)((r-g)+(i-g)+2A)
The corresponding equilibrium payoff for the bank and the
debtor are  B  =  lim  c  _1337rnhK  and
D  =  lim  0  63T)(c-e(1+f)7)hK
respectively, where K is the initial stock of capital. Then:
£11] B  =  nK/(r-g)
[12] D  =  (c-e(l+f'T))K/(i-g), where c=n-g+(e-l)x
Note  that  as  r-g the  bank's  payoff  B -m,  which  means  that  r>g
is a necessary condition for credit rationing. The above solution
for . 4a_umes  that it is an interior colution,  in the sense that
no party would find it more convenient to never agree. In the case
of the bank this means that 7ar0.  In the case of the debtor  this
means that the debtor does not prefer suffering sanctions forever
over paying n each period. In the next section the conditions
under which n is the true equilibrium are analyzed.
40When the disruption effect is negligible  (A=O), the exogenous
growth case is obtained. In this case, payments  (n), payments
relative to exports (n/x) and the market value of the debt
*
relative to exports  (B  /hx), are:
(l-q)x  (1-q)  (i-g)
(13]  r=a  ;  a/x  - where a
(l+f)  (l+f)  (r-g)+(i-g)
*  (1-q)
[14] B /hx =  a
(1+f)(r-g)h
5. ANALYSIS
The reason why one might expect a debtor to pay positive
amounts in equilibrium is that sanctions would hurt it and the
threat of their application  is credible. One way to see this is to
consider the case where sanctions are completely  ineffective
(either they can be costlessly circumvented  (q=l) or the economy
is completely closed  (x=O)). In this case there is not only no
static cost (the one associated with current consumption  for a
given investment level) but also no dynamic cost  (the one
associated with reduced investment), because there would be no
disruption to affect investment. Then A=O and n=O is obtained.
Except in this trivial case, if sanctions do have effect one would
expect that equilibrium payments would be strictly positive. This
is easily checked in the exogenous growth case displayed  in [13],
where the dynamic effect does not apply. However, it is not true
in general.
41It is possible that the debtor actually prefers the
applicatio  of sanctions. It can be checked, by comparing the
debtor's utility under permanent sanctions,  (c-(l-q)ex+A)K/(i-g'),
and the one calculated in [12] at the payment level 1  calculated
in [1^0, that  thc dcbtr  -Az;  T.,  ff'r  on  rTr  and
actually likes them if and only if n<O. Equilibrium payments
cannot be negative because before accepting that outcome the bank
would prefer to use its option of not agreeing to the
rescheduling. This implies that if i  is negative, a corner
42 solution with no payment obtains  . Therefore this dynamic model,
contrary to static or exogenous growth models, is able to generate
a  non-trivial equilibrium with no payment.
The reason why the debtor government may prefer  sanctions is
that while the static cost is unambiguously painful, the effect of
the dynamic component is ambiguous. If there are low returns to
investment and the government is so impatient that it prefers to
slow down the investment rate, then the dynamic component  is
actually beneficial. When the effect on investment is very large
there may be a consumption surge in the early periods, despite the
static cost of sanctions, which might dominate slower growth.  If
disruption effects are important and investment opportunities  not
too profitable,  impatient governments,  perhaps the least
development oriented, might be able to pull out the best deals.
42This neglects the possibility of the banks being able to adjust
sanctions and choose a higher q which might hurt country. I later
come back to this issue.
42Assuming in what follows that sanctions hurt, the debtor
prefers the equilibrium solution n>O to suffering sanctions. At
the same time, banks also prefer to settle at n>O rather than to
apply sanctions without extracting anything from the debtor.
Therefore the negotiations can be seen as a discussion about what
fraction of the cost of sanctions, which can be interpreted as the
bark's threat point, will be borne by the debtor in the form of
payments.
Exogenous growth  (A=O)
This interpretation about the negotiation  is particularly
clean in the exogenous growth case, where the sanctions amounts to
a trade loss equivalent to (l-q)Xt dollars. In this case, the
equilibrium payment in dollars, Pt, can be seen as a fraction
a/(l+f) of that trade loss (equation [13]), where  f2O by
assumption and, under the assumption that i>r>g, O<a<l.
The coefficient a  depends only on the rates i, r and g. As is
usual in simple bargaining games with time discounting, the more
impatient the player the worse the player does, and when both
players are equally impatient they share the pie in halves
_43 (a=1/2)  . In particular, in this model a higher world real
4 3Bulow and Rogoff obtain a reasonable result similar to this one
for what they call the bargaining region. However for the
punishment-constrained  region, which is the relevant one in this
paper, they obtain the unintuitive result that everything would be
as if the banks had all the bargaining power  (a=1 in this model).
This calls into question the rules of their barga.ining  game, which
are responsible for this disturbing result.
43interest rate r is to the debtor's advantage because it makes the
bank more impatient (in order to do business elsewhere), without
any additional effect. The market value of the debt, measured by
B ,  and therefore the secondary market price, would also decline
not only because payments are lower but also because of heavier
discounting  (see [14]). Impatient governments with a large
discount rate i, which to some extent can be interpreted as the
ones less development oriented, would end up striking worse deals
and therefore achieving a lower welfare level  (as measured with
any arbitrary welfare function based on aggregate consumption).
In this model the rate of growth g also affects a, but its
effect is not obvious. Contrary to the analysis of the players'
impatience, to our knowledge this effect has not been studied
44 before  It can be checked that aa/ag>o,  which means that the
faster the growth of the economy the larger the fraction the
debtor pays. The reason seems to be that what matters is the rate
of impatience relative to the rate of growth g. When g increases,
the relative impatience of the bank, which is smaller, decreases
in a larger proportion. Here the causality runs from investment to
debt payments. In an empirical investigation of the effect of debt
payments on investment, this positive feedback relation may mask
the presumably negative causal relation due to liquidity and debt
overhang effects.
44Bulow and Rogoff  touch on the  issue but provide no specific
analysis. The way in which they modify their solution in the case
of economic growth implies that growth has no effect on payments
as a share of the size of the economy. I conjecture that this is
44Apart from the parameters included in a, the other parameters
relevant for the determination of a  are the fiscel constraint
parameter f, the sanction parameter q and the degree of openness
of the economy measured by x. rhe role of  the parameters q and x
is straightforward, since the direct cost of sanctions  is (1-q)Xt,
which amounts to (1-q)x in relation to capital. It is useful to
interpret payment- as fractions of exports (n/x), where the
Eractions are determined b' a, and its underlying parameters,  q
and f. Similarly, the credit ceiling as measured by Bt can be
written as a multiple of current exports Xt, where the multiple  is
a(l-q)/(l+f)h(r-g) as shown in [143. This implies the well-known
results that the credit ceiling can be increased by opening the
economy and, for a given degree of openness, by being more
vulnerable to sanctions. The credit ceiling as a multiple of
exports, that is for a given degree of openness, would also expand
if world real interest rates were smaller and if the economy grew
faster.
It miqht not be surprising that  the  i'-  -. _r,t Af.icci  -y
parameter n does not appear in the solution, because in this model
the negotiations are driven by the threat of sanctions, which are
not related to the productive efficiency of the ecoxiuiny  given the
export level. It might be somewhat surprising, however, that the
foreign exchange constraint parameter e does not play a role
either. The reason for this is that this constraint, the high
marginal value of foreign exchange in terms of domestic output, is
an indirect cost magnifying the cost of both the debt payments and
45the default sanctions, since both affect the balance of payments45
If debt payments correspond to a constant fraction of the
sanctions in utility space, which one would expect given the
bargaining strength of the parties as measured by a, then they
correspond to the same constant fraction in dollars space
irrespective of the parameter e. The conclusion  is that the
foreign exchange constraint is irrelevant for the determination of
debt payments.
The case of the  fiscal constraint parameter f, which is an
indirect loss on top of the indirect loss due to the foreign
exchange constraint,  is different. This indirect cost is borne
only when payments are made, but not when sanctions are suffered.
A  larger fiscal constraint f, that is a more inefficient revenue
extraction mechanism to cover payments, tilts the balance against
agreeing to pay and leads to lower payments. This asymmetry leads
to the result that the lower the ability to pay, as reflected by
fiscal tightness, the lower the willingness to pay and therefore
the lower the equilibrium payment. For a aiven debtor this does
not translate into a welfare improvement, however, because the
lower payment exactly compensates for the magnified cost of
payments, as can be seen in C121.  A  novPrnrPnt  in  wnrrA  chAnr
regarding fiscal accounts gets better deals. This has implications
for the incentives to adjust which are parallel to the debt
45 In this linear model e plays a non-marginal role too. This is
inconsequential because in the exogenous growth case the sunk
gains from trade are not affected by sanctions or debt payments.
46overhang disincentives46
To summarize, comparative statics results are presented. The
parameters considered are the government rate of impatience  (i),
the world real interest rate (r), the rate of growth of the
economy  (g), the degree of openness  (x), the degree of foreign
exchange constraint  (e), the net productive investment efficiency
of the economy (n), the degree of fiscal constraint  (f), and the
terms of trade under sanctions  (q) . The variable analyzed is the
payment relative to exports  (n/x), referred to as the payment
fraction. Similar qualitative results obtain for the credit
ceiling, or equivalently the market value of the debt, relative to
exports  (B  /hx), referred to as the credit ceiling multiplier,  as
can be checked in £14]. The variables under study are independent
of the capital base. This comparative exercise can be seen as what
would happen if a permanent unexpected change occured in the
underlying parameters, perhaps as a result of policy, or,
alternatively, as a comparison across debtor countries.
i  g  x  n  e  r  f  q
n/x  +  +  0  0  0
Endogenous growth (A>O)
46These implications will be explored in a separate piece. It
should be noted that the parameter f can be also interpreted
as the political cost of servicing the debt, as seen by the
government.  In this case the result would be that  the more
politically  sensitive the debt crisis, the better  the  deal
and the higher social welfare.
47In this case many of the results in relation to the payment
fraction n/x and the ci  it  ceiling multiplier B /hx turn
ambiguous. As mentioned oefore, if the disruption effect A  is
large enough there is the possibility of no interior solution, and
therefore null equilibrium payments. In this case all parameters
are irrelevant. Assuming that such an extreme does not hold, the
corresponding comparative stat.Lcs  exercises involve the
differentiation of the general equation for n  (equation [10]). The
smoothness of this function i  assures that the comparative  statics
results of the exogenous growth case which are definite  (that is,
non-zero) continue to hold if disruption effects are small enough
(and A  is considered as an independent parameter). Since this
expression for n in [10] is bilinear with respect to each
parameter, the sign of the partial derivative with respect to any
parameter depends only on the rest of the parameters,  and is
therefore constant over the entire range. With large enough
disruption effects, ambiguity may arise; unless more assumptions
are made, the sign of these constants is sometimes undetermined.
Some results are unambiguous. The negative relation between
the real world interest rate and payments still holds  for the same
reason: a larger interest rate diminishes the present value of
future collections and makes the bank more eager to settle.
Similarly, it still holds true that faster growth  increases
payments and that a higher fiscal constraint leads to lower
payments, which are still divided by (1+f). In contrast, now the
net investment efficiency of the economy n matters because it is
important for the determination of the cost of slower growth due
48to disruption. Higher productivity, as measured by n, leads to
higher payments.
The role of the debtor's impatience is ambiguous,  in contrast
to the exogenous growth model where more impatience always  leads
to worse outcomes. Here a more impatient debtor  (that is, one with
a larger i) may get a better deal because it also discounts more
heavily the cost of lower economic growth. The impact of the
parameters x and e, which in the exogenous case were irrelevant,
are now ambiguous too.
Unless the debtor is very impatient and investment efficiency
low  ,  it can be expected that a higher x would lead to a lower
payment fraction n/x. As can be easily checked by inspecting n/x,
the effect of x depends on the sign of n-i: it is negative
(positive) when i<n (i>n).  The reason is that the cost the debtor
incurs as a consequence of slower growth due to sanctions has a
domestic component independent of x whose sign depends on n-i, as
can be seen in [7]. Assuming that the government finds the
observed actual investment rate to be too low, that is i<n 47, the
result is obtained that more open countries manage to pay lower
payment fractions n/x. Since smaller countries are qenerally more
specialized and therefore more open, this result implies that
smaller countries can be expected to pay lower payment fractions.
47The parameter n measures the net marginal productivity  of
capital  (neglecting external  effects  related to gains  from
trade).
49If the debtor's welfare in case of a rejection, D,  increases
with the disruptio.:  A  for given future payments d, which, for
example, is obtained if the government is very impatient compared
to investment net return and increases in current consumption more
than compensate slower growth, then more disruption  leads to lower
equilibrium payments. This makes sense because in this case rore
disruption diminishes the expected cost of sanctions. This is the
case when the dynamic cost of sanctions is negative. If,
alternatively, D  decreases with the disruption A  for given future
payments d, which can be seen as the normal case where sanctions
are painful also in their dynamic component, the effect on
payments is ambiguous.
The reason for the ambiguity is that the bank's future
collections after a rejection (B  R), for given future payments b,
also decrease with disruption because the economy grows more
slowly. In other words, the dynamic effect of sanctions is also
painful for the banks. This cost calls into question the
credibility of the threat of applying default sanctions. The net
effect on equilibrium payments depends on the relative weight of
these two opposing forces. In particular, as can be checked by
differentiating  10] with respect to A, if the debtor is
sufficiently impatient and capital inefficient, even if disruption
hurts him ,  the second force dominates and the debtor makes better
deals with more powerful disruption effects. In that case, growth
weakness is a safeguard against being attacked, and vulnerable
countries end up transferring smaller fractions of their
international trade.
50The analysis for the parameter q could be formally done
following the same method. In this case, it still holds true that
q has a negative effect on payments. However, it makes more sense
to consider that the disruption effect A  is endogenous and
decreases with the parameter q. To  the extent that q negatively
relates to A, its effect on payments depend on how disruption
affects payments. If more disruption leads to larger payments,
then it still holds true that the more resilient the economy (the
larger q), the lower the payment fraction. If more disruption
leads to lower payments, then the effect of q on payments become
ambiguous. This suggests that the banks might prefer to use less
sanctions than the ones they could use in order to achieve a
better outcome.
If x defines a normal level of import financing ,  and
therefore specialization and dependence on international markets,
it makes sense to assume that the core imported capital goods
which are difficult to substitute domestically are a fraction m of
the total. If qtm (sanctions are not very severe), critical
imports are not affected, A=O and the exogenous growth case
obtains. If q<m,  (m-q)x  critical imports cannot be financed. In
relative  terms  this  corresponds  to a fraction  (1-al/m)  whic  h  ic
presumably the relevant measure of the impact on A. Note that
since A does not depend on the rest of the parameters analyzed,
the previous results for those parameters still hold.
If a linear specification is assumed, A=a(l-q/m), where a;O
51is a sensitivity parameter48.  Then the above discussion about the
effect of A applies to the sensitivity parameter a and the
threshold parameter m. In this case, the payment n is bilinear in
q. Therefore the harshness of  the sanctions, as measured by q,
monotonically  increase or diminish payments. It higher potential
sanctions lead to more payments, then the banks would set q at its
minimum value, as expected. If, however, more potential sanctions
lead to less payments, then banks would like to adjust sanctions
and lower them in order not to affect th3 debtor's growth  (that
is, q=m). This requires a high enough investment sensitivity a. In
this case, A=C and the exogenous case obtains.
It is not clear whether banks would be able to commit to such
a  restraint once the legal procedures are followed and gains from
seizure become available. If they cannot commit and the only
option is not to apply sanctions at all, this option  (q=l) may
dominate  and an equilibrium with no payments may emerge.  Even if
there is a continuous choice over the sanctions severity, if the
debtor is extremely dependent on imported investment goods and
m=l, then q=l is an equilibrium with  no payment. In both cases
this zero-paynent equilibrium obtains because the banks would
choose not to apply sanctions  (q=1),  which makes them not
credible.
To summarize, comparative statics results are presented. The
sensitivity of investment to critical imports ,  a, is added to the
48In  a  two-gap model  formulation  where  domestic  investment  is a
multiple of (core) imported investment goods, a=s.
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parameters studied in the exogenous growth case  It is assumed
that sanctions hurt the debtor, that is T>O,  because otherwise
zero payments obtain. It is further assumed that there is a
positive disruption effect, that is A>O, because otherwise the
exogenous growth case obtains and the previous results apply. This
is equivalent to assuming that a>O and that sanctions are
sufficiently severe  (q<m). The results reported are valid  for
arbitrary positive disruption effects. In the special case where
they are small  (A-O, or equivalently, a-O), the definite results
of the exogenous growth case apply. In this case the effect of i
and q can be signed unambiguously.
i  g  x  n  e  r  f  q  a
r/x  +  (*)  +  ?  - - (**)  ?
(*)  Sign of i-n
(**)  Negative if a(n/x)/aa positive.
Debt service and mprket discounts
Let Ft be the face value of the debt at time t. Since credit
rationing is assumed, its market value is, by definition,  Bt. Let
the  secondary market discount at time t be pt. Then:
(15] Bt =  (1-pt)Ft  Pt-0
49 .,milar  results can be obtained  for the  critical  imports
snare m.
53Let At be the fraction of total interest service computed at
the market rate r which is not covered by the payment Pt. In other
words, total interest service rhFt is partially financed by new
money in the amount XtrhFt. Then:
[16] Pt =  (l-At)rhFt
Using  [11] and substituting Pt=7ThKt,  [15] and [16] yield a
linear relation between the market discount p and the fraction of
unpaid interest service A at any point in time:
[17] Pt =  (rAt-g)/(r-g)
As stated above, for credit rationing, r>g, which is assumed.
Since pt5 1 because the market value of the debt cannot be
negative, then the fraction A  tsl. In other words, as expected,
payments cannot be negative in equilibrium; when they are null,
Att=l  and the debt market discount reaches its maximum  (pt=l). On
the other extreme, the market discount would vanish  (pt.=O)  when
the unserviced portion of total interest payments is not larger
than g/r<l. When the face value of the debt equals the credit
ceilina, that is Ft=Bt, in which case there is a zero market
discount, the borderline case At=g/r is obtained. Service payments
beyond this minimum rate of new money financing are inconsistent
with credit rationing. Note that to the extent that there is
positive economic growth  (g>0), only relatively large amounts of
54new money are consistent with credit rationing50.
The dynamic evolution of the market discount pt  (or
equivalently, of the the unserviced portion At making use of
[16]), depends on expected payments, which have already been
determined, and debt accumulation. Debt accumulation depends on
the interest rate charged on new loans in the case of explicit
rescheduling agreements or imputed to service arrears in the
absence of explicit agreements. In a non-rationing regime, the
rate charged for roll-overs should be the competitive  rate r. As
long as there is credit rationing, competition breaks down and the
rate charged is a matter of negotiation. In the context of this
model this rate is irrelevant as long as the face value of the
debt does not fall below the credit ceiling. Assuming that in this
case the applicable rate is also r, which as will be shown is
consistent with this model, a description of the dynamics of debt
accumulation can be provided for the case of credit rationing and
compared to the case of a non-rationing regime. This assumption  is
the standard one51 and appears to r3conably  reemble  reality.
Let the face value of the debt in terms of capital at time t,
IF.'K.  he  f  Let the initial credit ccilinrg  i. terms Of capita.,
*,  t,  "  - t
B*IKO, be m. As can be checked in [11], this ratio remains
constant over time, that is to say both the credit ceiling and
50Allowing for uncertainty, the relationship between market
discounts and current payments would be true in some average
sense.
11.is  includes models where this rate is not irrelevant and
therefore potentially  inconsistent.
55capital grow at the rate g. Since credit rationing is assumed at
time 0, the credit ceiling corresponds to the market value of the
debt and therefore msfO. The dynamic evolution of the ratio ft
follows the difference equation52:
[18] ft+h  ft-(1)  bh/7
Solving [18] and letting h-0, it is found that debt
accumulates according to:
[19] f  =  f  +  (f -m)(e  (r-g)t  1) t  0 
It is being assumed that r>g, which is a necessary condition
for credit rationing. If at time 0 the face value of the debt
exceeded the credit ceiling, that is if there was credit rationing
and a positive market discount, then f >m and f  is monotonically 0 
increasing and unbounded. In this case, the debt grows  faster than
the economy and the country is forever credit rationed, which  is
consistent with the assumption in the model.  If at time 0 the face
value of the debt was below the credit ceiling, that is if there
was not credit rationing, f0<m and the model does not apply. If,
hypothetically, the same payment fractions n were made, then ft
would be monotonically decreasing and unbounded  (the country would
end up being a creditor). In the borderline case where the
original face value coincided with the credit ceiling, fO=m and ft
remains always equal to the credit ceiling, which implies that
52This assumes that the bank makes the opening offer, but this
asymmetry vanishes when limits are taken.
56debt grows at the same rate as the economy.
From [15] it is apparent that pt=l-m/ft. Therefore, starting
from a positive market discount pO>0, the market discount Pt would
be monotonically increasing and would approach 1. It can be
checked in [17] that in this case the unserviced portion of
interest payments, At. would also be monotoniccilly  increasing and
approach 1.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper models a dynamic bilateral bargaining game between
a  credit-rationed debtor country and its commercial bank creditors
based on the simple paradigm that if no agreement is reached for a
current  (possibly partial) payment, either implicit by the
acceptance of the corresponding transfer or explicit in the form
of a rescheduling agreement subject to renegotiation once the
current payment is made, the banks would apply default sanctions
(to the extent they can hurt the debtor by doing so). Under
general conditions  it is found that settlements will be reached
and default sanctions will not be applied in equilibrium. However,
their application is a credible threat which underlies the
negotiations and determines the equilibrium  payments. In turn,
these equilibrium payments determine the ex  ante  credit ceiling,
which is the present discounted value of expected payments, and
the ex  post  commercial debt market discount.
Default sanctions are assumed to disrupt international trade.
57On the one hand, they have a static component which affects
current consumption for an exogenously given investment level. On
the other hand, they have a dynamic component which may affect the
investment level. This last dimension, which has been neglected so
far in the literature, is able to generate qualitatively different
results. The static component entails a reduction in domestic
absorption which falls entirely on current consumption and is
therefore unambiguously costly for the debtor. The dynamic
component would also be costly to the extent that the debtor
government prefers to increase the investment rate. If the
government is sufficiently impatient and investment returns
sufficiently low, however, the debtor government may prefer to
lower the investment rate that would prevail otherwise,  in which
case the dynamic component of the sanctions may be actually
beneficial to the debtor.
In the case of exogenous growth, where disruption effects on
investment due to sanctions are negligible, only the static cost
is relevant. Then sanctions are unambiguously costly and payments
are positive. Payments turn out to be a constant fraction of
exports  (the payment fraction). The payment fraction is
proportional to the cost of trade disruption  (the loss in gains
from trade) as a share of exports, decreasing with the world real
interest rate and increasing with the debtor's rate of time
preference,  as expected. Also not surprisingly in this
willingness-to-pay  framework, and in contrast to an ability-to-pay
approach, both the productive efficiency of the economy and its
degree of openness are irrelevant for determining  the payment
58fraction.
An interesting and new result is that the payment fraction
increases with the economic growth rate of the economy. The reason
is that what matters in a dynamic context is each party's rate of
impatience relative to the growth rate of the economy. Here fast
growing countries obtain less favorable deals because they have
relatively less bargaining power, which would induce a positive
relationship between growth and debt service possibly masking the
existence of debt overhang effects on growth.
Another interesting finding has to do with the role played by
foreign exchange and fiscal constraints. Payments entail a direct
cost in terms of exports and two indirect costs in terms of
domestic resources: the cost involved in the transformation of
domestic resources into foreign currency, due to a foreign
exchange constraint associated with decreasing export returns, and
the cost involved in the extraction of resources from the private
sector in order to service public debt, due to a fiscal constraint
associated with tax inefficiencies. The foreign exchange
constraint turns out to be irrelevant because it affects both the
cost of sanctions and the cost of settlement. One implication of
this is that  an unanticipated permanent change in terms of trade
should not have an effect on the payment fraction.
The fiscal constraint, in contrast, affects only the cost of
settlement and is therefore relevant. The more costly it is to
raise additional public revenue, that is the tighter the fiscal
59framework, the better the deal for the debtor  (the additional cost
is compensated by smaller payments). To the extent that fiscal
adjustment is costly, this positive linkage between adjustment and
payments, like in the debt overhang argument, negatively affects
the incentives for adjustment. A different interpretation of the
fiscal cost in political terms suggests that political costs and
instability associated with the service of the debt would also
lead to better deals. Differences in the fiscal constraints among
debtor countries may explain variations  in payment fractions.
In the general case of endogenous growth, where default
sanctions have a non-negligible dynamic component in terms of
diminished investment, qualitatively different results can be
generated. If the economy has poor investment opportunities,  that
is investment returns are relatively low, and the government  is
very impatient, the dynamic component of sanctions may be
beneficial to the government. The extreme case where this benefit
dominates the static cost of sanctions is possible, in which case
a  non-trivial equilibrium with no payments is obtained.
Assuming that sanctions hurt overall, payments are positive.
If investment disruption is beneficial to the government,  then
this dynamic effect leads to payments smaller than otherwise.
Economies with poor investment opportunities and myopic
governments obtain better deals. Perhaps surprisingly,  investment
disruption caused by sanctions may also lead to smaller payment
fractions when investment disruption is costly. The reason  is that
slower growth is also costly for tha banks in terms of future
60collections. This dynamic consideration, in contrast to the
traditional static approach, points to the fact that what matters
is not only the threat at the disposal of the banks,  in terms of
the cost that the debtor may be inflicted upon, but also the
credibility of its realization to the extent that it may hurt the
banks. Growth weakness may be a safeguard against being attacked
and lead to better deals. Banks may actually choose to
unilaterally limit the intensity o, their sanctions in order to
diminish or even eliminate the investment disruption,  in which
case the exogenous growth case would obtain as an equilibrium
result by virtue of this dynamic dimension.
The dynamic dimension of sanctions leads to other amendments
to the static analysis of payment fractions. Now the debtor's rate
of time preference has an ambiguous effect. A more impatient
debtor is more eagur to settle  (the usual static factor) but is
also less sensitive to slower growth  (the new dynamic factor).
This dynamic dimension also leads to larger payments  for countries
with better investment opportunities, an element which was
irrelevant in the static case. The degree of openness of the
economy is also relevant now for the payment fraction because the
dynamic costs of sanctions also depend on the domestic no1tpn*iAl
of the economy. Unless investment opportunities are poor and the
government is very impatient, more open economies obtain better
deals in terms of payment fractions. This  implies that smaller
countries, which are generally more specialized and open, can be
expected to be stronger negotiators and pay smaller payment
fractions.
61There is a linear relation between the debt market discount
at a point in time and the portion of total interest payments  (at
the market rate) which is currently financed with new money.  In
the context of a growing economy, new money can be expected to be
significant. Positive but relatively small amounts on average are
inconsistent with market discounts. Assuming that unserviced debt
is charged the competitive world interest rate, which is
consistent with this model, debt grows faster than the economy and
the debt market discount approaches 1.
There are two directions for future research which we plan to
pursue building on this model. From an analytical point of view,
third parties, such as creditor country governments and
international financial institutions, may play a significant  role
in the bargaining game between debtor countries and commercial
banks and should be considered. From an empirical point of view,
the model should be estimated and tested. To do this it will be
necessary to distinguish those parameters which are observable,
Irarn  if  iMnprfAr$-1V.  frnm  thnct  whir.h  vre not  ITn  the context  of
this model there is a perfect equivalence between payment
fractions, related to current transfers, and payment multipliers,
rclat--  to th^ m.a  rket value of the debt and therefore secondary
market discounts. In the empirical application the two approaches
will need to be evaluated.
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